The Parallel Complexity of Coloring Games

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9928)

Abstract

We wish to motivate the problem of finding decentralized lower-bounds on the complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium in graph games. While the centralized computation of an equilibrium in polynomial time is generally perceived as a positive result, this does not reflect well the reality of some applications where the game serves to implement distributed resource allocation algorithms, or to model the social choices of users with limited memory and computing power. As a case study, we investigate on the parallel complexity of a game-theoretic variation of graph coloring. These “coloring games” were shown to capture key properties of the more general welfare games and Hedonic games. On the positive side, it can be computed a Nash equilibrium in polynomial-time for any such game with a local search algorithm. However, the algorithm is time-consuming and it requires polynomial space. The latter questions the use of coloring games in the modeling of information-propagation in social networks. We prove that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a given coloring game is PTIME-hard, and so, it is unlikely that one can be computed with an efficient distributed algorithm. The latter brings more insights on the complexity of these games.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Université Côte D’Azur, Inria, CNRS, I3SSophia AntipolisFrance

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