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Unsicherheit

  • Hans Rüdiger Pfister
  • Helmut Jungermann
  • Katrin Fischer
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

Entscheidungen finden oft „unter Unsicherheit“ statt. Im Allgemeinen ist damit gemeint, dass für den Entscheider die möglichen Konsequenzen der Optionen unsicher sind, weil die Konsequenzen auch von anderen, durch ihn nicht kontrollierbaren Ereignissen abhängig sind. Wie Menschen mit dieser Unsicherheit umgehen, wie sie ihre „subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeiten“ bilden, verändern, direkt zum Ausdruck bringen oder in ihrem Verhalten zeigen, ist ein zentrales Thema der Entscheidungsforschung. Damit werden wir uns in diesem Kapitel beschäftigen.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hans Rüdiger Pfister
    • 1
  • Helmut Jungermann
    • 2
  • Katrin Fischer
    • 3
  1. 1.Institut für Experimentelle WirtschaftspsychologieLeuphana Universität LüneburgLüneburgDeutschland
  2. 2.Inst. für Psychologie und ArbeitswissenschaftenTU BerlinBerlinDeutschland
  3. 3.Hochschule für Angewandte PsychologieFachhochschule NordwestschweizOltenSchweiz

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