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Kognitive Systeme und Prozesse

  • Hans Rüdiger Pfister
  • Helmut Jungermann
  • Katrin Fischer
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

Wir haben in den vorangegangenen Kapiteln an vielen Stellen auf kognitionspsychologische Modelle verwiesen, mithilfe derer Urteils- und Entscheidungsprozesse besser verstanden werden können; insbesondere die Forschung zu Urteilsheuristiken hat schon immer versucht, sowohl das oft effiziente und erfolgreiche Urteilen als auch die Entstehung von Urteilsfehlern und Biases durch die Anwendung von kognitiven Regeln zu erklären (Kap. 5). Der Begriff des Framing (Kap. 6) beruht wesentlich auf der Annahme, dass nicht die objektive Struktur, sondern die subjektive mentale Repräsentation einer Entscheidungssituation die relevante Basis für Entscheidungsprozesse darstellt. Ebenso sind die meisten Theorien der Strategieselektion und -anwendung bei multiattributen Entscheidungen als kognitive Prozessmodelle formuliert (Kap. 4 und 7). Aus dieser kognitionspsychologischen Perspektive können Entscheidungen als komplexe Prozesse, die aus elementaren kognitiven Mechanismen aufgebaut sind und mentale Repräsentationen nutzen, aufgefasst werden. Die Forderung, Entscheidungsforschung und Kognitionspsychologie stärker zu integrieren, hat – obwohl noch immer eine Lücke zu beobachten ist, die beide Forschungstraditionen trennt – in den letzten zwanzig Jahren immense Fortschritte gemacht (BusemeyerBusemeyer, J.Hastie, R.Medin, D. et al.1995; E. U. WeberWeber, E. & JohnsonJohnson, E.2009; OppenheimerOppenheimer, D. & KelsoKelso, E.2015).

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hans Rüdiger Pfister
    • 1
  • Helmut Jungermann
    • 2
  • Katrin Fischer
    • 3
  1. 1.Institut für Experimentelle WirtschaftspsychologieLeuphana Universität LüneburgLüneburgDeutschland
  2. 2.Inst. für Psychologie und ArbeitswissenschaftenTU BerlinBerlinDeutschland
  3. 3.Hochschule für Angewandte PsychologieFachhochschule NordwestschweizOltenSchweiz

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