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Safely Exporting Keys from Secure Channels

On the Security of EAP-TLS and TLS Key Exporters
  • Christina Brzuska
  • Håkon Jacobsen
  • Douglas Stebila
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9665)

Abstract

We investigate how to safely export additional cryptographic keys from secure channel protocols, modelled with the authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) security notion. For example, the EAP-TLS protocol uses the Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake to output an additional shared secret which can be used for purposes outside of TLS, and the RFC 5705 standard specifies a general mechanism for exporting keying material from TLS. We show that, for a class of ACCE protocols we call “TLS-like” protocols, the EAP-TLS transformation can be used to export an additional key, and that the result is a secure AKE protocol in the Bellare–Rogaway model. Interestingly, we are able to carry out the proof without looking at the specifics of the TLS protocol itself (beyond the notion that it is “TLS-like”), but rather are able to use the ACCE property in a semi black-box way. To facilitate our modular proof, we develop a novel technique, notably an encryption-based key checking mechanism that is used by the security reduction. Our results imply that EAP-TLS using secure TLS 1.2 ciphersuites is a secure authenticated key exchange protocol.

Keywords

Random Oracle Extensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security Master Secret Authenticate Encryption Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Colin Boyd and Britta Hale for helpful comments and discussions. Part of this work was done while Christina Brzuska was working for Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK. Christina Brzuska is grateful to NXP Semiconductors for supporting her chair for IT Security Analysis. Håkon Jacobsen was hosted by Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK, for parts of this work. Some of this work performed while Douglas Stebila was hosted by the Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christina Brzuska
    • 1
  • Håkon Jacobsen
    • 2
  • Douglas Stebila
    • 3
    • 4
  1. 1.Hamburg University of TechnologyHamburgGermany
  2. 2.Norwegian University of Science and TechnologyTrondheimNorway
  3. 3.Queensland University of TechnologyBrisbaneAustralia
  4. 4.McMaster UniversityHamiltonCanada

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