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Probabilistic Functions and Cryptographic Oracles in Higher Order Logic

  • Andreas Lochbihler
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9632)

Abstract

This paper presents a shallow embedding of a probabilistic functional programming language in higher order logic. The language features monadic sequencing, recursion, random sampling, failures and failure handling, and black-box access to oracles. Oracles are probabilistic functions which maintain hidden state between different invocations. To that end, we propose generative probabilistic systems as the semantic domain in which the operators of the language are defined. We prove that these operators are parametric and derive a relational program logic for reasoning about programs from parametricity. Several examples demonstrate that our language is suitable for conducting cryptographic proofs.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Johannes Hölzl helped us with formalising spmfs on top of his probability formalisation and with the proof of countable support of spmf chains. Christoph Sprenger and Dmitriy Traytel and the anonymous reviewers suggested improvements of the presentation and the examples. This work was supported by SNSF grant 153217 “Formalising Computational Soundness for Protocol Implementations”.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Information Securiy, Department of Computer ScienceETH ZurichZurichSwitzerland

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