Individual Rationality in Competitive Multiagent Systems

  • Jianye Hao
  • Ho-fung Leung
Chapter

Abstract

In competitive MASs, each individual agent is usually interested in maximizing its personal benefits only, which may have conflicts with the utility of others and the overall system as well. Thus, one natural research direction in competitive MASs is to consider how an agent can learn to obtain as much utility as possible against different opponents based on its local information. Another important question is raised from the system designer’s perspective, i.e., how can the selfish agents be incentivized to coordinate their behaviors to maximize the system-level performance (i.e., maximizing social optimality)? In this chapter, we focus on the first research direction by considering an important competitive multiagent interaction scenario: bilateral negotiation [1]. The second research direction will be the focus of Chap. 6

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Copyright information

© Higher Education Press, Beijing and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jianye Hao
    • 1
  • Ho-fung Leung
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Computer SoftwareTianjin UniversityTianjinChina
  2. 2.Department of Computer Sci. and Eng.The Chinese University of Hong KongHong KongChina

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