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Onion ORAM: A Constant Bandwidth Blowup Oblivious RAM

  • Srinivas Devadas
  • Marten van Dijk
  • Christopher W. FletcherEmail author
  • Ling RenEmail author
  • Elaine Shi
  • Daniel Wichs
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9563)

Abstract

We present Onion ORAM, an Oblivious RAM (ORAM) with constant worst-case bandwidth blowup that leverages poly-logarithmic server computation to circumvent the logarithmic lower bound on ORAM bandwidth blowup. Our construction does not require fully homomorphic encryption, but employs an additively homomorphic encryption scheme such as the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem, or alternatively a BGV-style somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme without bootstrapping. At the core of our construction is an ORAM scheme that has “shallow circuit depth” over the entire history of ORAM accesses. We also propose novel techniques to achieve security against a malicious server, without resorting to expensive and non-standard techniques such as SNARKs. To the best of our knowledge, Onion ORAM is the first concrete instantiation of a constant bandwidth blowup ORAM under standard assumptions (even for the semi-honest setting).

Keywords

Data Block Server Computation Homomorphic Encryption Chunk Size Select Operation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

We thank Vinod Vaikuntanathan for helpful discussion on this work.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Srinivas Devadas
    • 1
  • Marten van Dijk
    • 2
  • Christopher W. Fletcher
    • 1
    Email author
  • Ling Ren
    • 1
    Email author
  • Elaine Shi
    • 3
  • Daniel Wichs
    • 4
  1. 1.Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA
  2. 2.University of ConnecticutStorrsUSA
  3. 3.Cornell UniversityIthacaUSA
  4. 4.Northeastern UniversityBostonUSA

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