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Public Verifiability in the Covert Model (Almost) for Free

  • Vladimir KolesnikovEmail author
  • Alex J. Malozemoff
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9453)

Abstract

The covert security model (Aumann and Lindell, TCC 2007) offers an important security/efficiency trade-off: a covert player may arbitrarily cheat, but is caught with a certain fixed probability. This permits more efficient protocols than the malicious setting while still giving meaningful security guarantees. However, one drawback is that cheating cannot be proven to a third party, which prevents the use of covert protocols in many practical settings. Recently, Asharov and Orlandi (ASIACRYPT 2012) enhanced the covert model by allowing the honest player to generate a proof of cheating, checkable by any third party. Their model, which we call the PVC (publicly verifiable covert) model, offers a very compelling trade-off.

Asharov and Orlandi (AO) propose a practical protocol in the PVC model, which, however, relies on a specific expensive oblivious transfer (OT) protocol incompatible with OT extension. In this work, we improve the performance of the PVC model by constructing a PVC-compatible OT extension as well as making several practical improvements to the AO protocol. As compared to the state-of-the-art OT extension-based two-party covert protocol, our PVC protocol adds relatively little: four signatures and an \(\approx 67\,\%\) wider OT extension matrix. This is a significant improvement over the AO protocol, which requires public-key-based OTs per input bit. We present detailed estimates showing (up to orders of magnitude) concrete performance improvements over the AO protocol and a recent malicious protocol.

Keywords

Secure computation Publicly verifiable covert security 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Michael Zohner for a brief discussion on the relative performance of public- and symmetric-key primitives, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions.

The authors acknowledge the Office of Naval Research and its support of this work under contract N00014-14-C-0113. Work of Alex J. Malozemoff was also supported by the Department of Defense (DoD) through the National Defense Science & Engineering Graduate (NDSEG) Fellowship.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologc Research 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Bell LabsMurray HillUSA
  2. 2.University of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

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