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Introspection, Normality and Agglomeration

  • Dominik Klein
  • Norbert Gratzl
  • Olivier Roy
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9394)

Abstract

This paper explores a non-normal logic of beliefs for boundedly rational agents. The logic we study stems from the epistemic-doxastic system developed by Stalnaker [1]. In that system, if knowledge is not positively introspective then beliefs are not closed under conjunction. They are, however, required to be pairwise consistent, a requirement that has been called agglomerativity elsewhere. While bounded agglomerativity requirements, i.e., joint consistency for every n-tuple of beliefs up to a fixed n, are expressible in that logic, unbounded agglomerativity is not. We study an extension of this logic of beliefs with such an unbounded agglomerativity operator, provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, show that it has a sequent calculus that enjoys the admissibility of cut, that it has the finite model property, and that it is decidable.

Keywords

Belief Revision Rationality Requirement Proof Theory Sequent Calculus Neighborhood Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dominik Klein
    • 1
    • 3
  • Norbert Gratzl
    • 2
  • Olivier Roy
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BayreuthBayreuthGermany
  2. 2.LMU MunichMunichGermany
  3. 3.University of BambergBambergGermany

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