Further Results on Capacitated Network Design Games

  • Thomas Erlebach
  • Matthew RadojaEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9347)


In a capacitated network design game, each of n players selects a path from her source to her sink. The cost of each edge is shared equally among the players using the edge. Every edge has a finite capacity that limits the number of players using the edge. We study the price of stability for such games with respect to the max-cost objective, i.e., the maximum cost paid by any player. We show that the price of stability is O(n) for symmetric games, and this bound is tight. Furthermore, we show that the price of stability for asymmetric games can be \(\varOmega (n \log n)\), matching the previously known upper bound. We also prove that the convergence time of best response dynamics cannot be bounded by any function of n.


Nash Equilibrium Convergence Time Social Optimum Strategy Profile Congestion Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of LeicesterLeicesterUK

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