Logics for Dynamic Epistemic Behavioral Strategies

Chapter

Abstract

This paper shows how the probabilistic logic of communication and change can be used to reason about finite extensive-form games with incomplete or imperfect information and with probabilistic nature moves. The results of probabilistic behavioral strategies can be expressed, as well as the results of strategies that are sensitive not also just to the history of the game, but also to the beliefs of agents. Using this logic, game-theoretic concepts, such as best response, Nash equilibrium, and rationality can be expressed with respect to a finite set of possible strategies. Extensions to the logic are also proposed to allow for the comparison between one strategy and infinitely many others, thus providing less restricted expressions for best response, Nash equilibrium, and rationality.

Keywords

Dynamic epistemic logic Valuation change Behavioural strategies Imperfect information games  

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Mathematics and StatisticsCalifornia State University Long BeachLong BeachUSA

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