Active Linking Attacks

  • Henning SchnoorEmail author
  • Oliver Woizekowski
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9235)


We study linking attacks on communication protocols. We observe that an active attacker is strictly more powerful in this setting than previously-considered passive attackers. We introduce a formal model to reason about active linking attacks, formally define security against these attacks and give conditions for both security and insecurity of protocols. In addition, we introduce a composition-like technique that allows to obtain security proofs by only studying small components of a protocol.


Function Call Secure Protocol Security Proof User Session Tracking Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut Für InformatikChristian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel Olshausenstraße 40KielGermany

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