The Disclosure of Evidence Under the ‘Antitrust Damages’ Directive 2014/104/EU

  • Anca D. ChiritaEmail author
Part of the Europeanization and Globalization book series (EAG, volume 3)


The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the principles underpinning the disclosure of evidence under Directive 2014/104/EU, namely the principles of proportionality, effectiveness, equivalence and consistency. It also aims to review the legislative techniques that the Directive has used in order to codify the previous case law of the European Union (EU) courts and to discuss several recent rulings, including Carglass, Pilkington, Evonik Degussa and others. Finally, the author draws conclusions on the adequacy of the achieved codification of the previous case law on the disclosure of evidence and access to such evidence, as well as on its potential implications for the Member States.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Durham UniversityDurhamUK

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