FSE 2014: Fast Software Encryption pp 431-450 | Cite as

Improved Slender-Set Linear Cryptanalysis

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8540)

Abstract

In 2013, Borghoff et al. introduced a slender-set linear cryptanalysis on PRESENT-like ciphers with key-dependent secret S-boxes. In this paper, we propose an improved slender-set linear attack to PRESENT-like ciphers with secret S-boxes. We investigate three new cryptanalytic techniques, and use them to recover the secret S-boxes efficiently. Our first new idea is that we propose a new technique to support consistency of partitions of the input to the secret S-boxes. Our second new technique is that we present a more efficient method to recover the coordinate functions of secret S-boxes based on more information than that of Borghoff’s attack. The third new technique is that we propose a method of constructing all correct coordinate function of secret S-boxes by pruning search algorithm. In particular, we implemented a successful linear attack on the full round Maya in practice. In our experiments, the correct S-box can be recovered with \(2^{36}\) known plaintexts, \(2^{18.9}\) time complexity and negligible memory complexity at a success rate of 87.5 % based on 200 independent trials. Our attack is the improvement and sequel of Borghoff’s work on PRESENT-like cipher with secret S-boxes.

Keywords

Block cipher Linear cryptanalysis PRESENT-like Secret S-box 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for very useful comments that help to improve the paper. This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61272488, No. 61272465).

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Information Science and Technology InstituteZhengzhouChina
  2. 2.Xinyang Normal UniversityXinyangChina

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