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Automatically Checking Commitment Protocols in ProVerif without False Attacks

  • Tom Chothia
  • Ben Smyth
  • Chris Staite
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9036)

Abstract

ProVerif over-approximates the attacker’s power to enable verification of processes under replication. Unfortunately, this results in ProVerif finding false attacks. This problem is particularly common in protocols whereby a participant commits to a particular value and later reveals their value. We introduce a method to reduce false attacks when analysing secrecy. First, we show how inserting phases into non-replicated processes enables a more accurate translation to Horn clauses which avoids some false attacks. Secondly, we generalise our methodology to processes under replication. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of our technique by analysing BlueTooth Simple Pairing. Moreover, we propose a simplification of this protocol that achieves the same security goal.

Keywords

Security Protocol Impersonation Attack Horn Clause Cryptographic Protocol Collision Attack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tom Chothia
    • 1
  • Ben Smyth
    • 2
  • Chris Staite
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceUniversity of BirminghamBirminghamUK
  2. 2.Mathematical and Algorithmic Sciences Lab, France Research CenterHuawei Technologies Co. Ltd.ParisFrance

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