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Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on Generic Feistel Constructions

  • Jian Guo
  • Jérémy Jean
  • Ivica Nikolić
  • Yu Sasaki
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8873)

Abstract

We show key recovery attacks on generic balanced Feistel ciphers. The analysis is based on the meet-in-the-middle technique and exploits truncated differentials that are present in the ciphers due to the Feistel construction. Depending on the type of round function, we differentiate and show attacks on two types of Feistels. For the first type, which is the most general Feistel, we show a 5-round distinguisher (based on a truncated differential), which allows to launch 6-round and 10-round attacks, for single-key and double-key sizes, respectively. For the second type, we assume the round function follows the SPN structure with a linear layer P that has a maximal branch number, and based on a 7-round distinguisher, we show attacks that reach up to 14 rounds. Our attacks outperform all the known attacks for any key sizes, have been experimentally verified (implemented on a regular PC), and provide new lower bounds on the number of rounds required to achieve a practical and a secure Feistel.

Keywords

Feistel generic attack key recovery meet-in-the-middle 

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jian Guo
    • 1
  • Jérémy Jean
    • 1
  • Ivica Nikolić
    • 1
  • Yu Sasaki
    • 2
  1. 1.Nanyang Technological UniversitySingapore
  2. 2.NTT Secure Platform LaboratoriesTokyoJapan

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