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Mixcoin: Anonymity for Bitcoin with Accountable Mixes

  • Joseph BonneauEmail author
  • Arvind Narayanan
  • Andrew Miller
  • Jeremy Clark
  • Joshua A. Kroll
  • Edward W. Felten
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8437)

Abstract

We propose Mixcoin, a protocol to facilitate anonymous payments in Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies. We build on the emergent phenomenon of currency mixes, adding an accountability mechanism to expose theft. We demonstrate that incentives of mixes and clients can be aligned to ensure that rational mixes will not steal. Our scheme is efficient and fully compatible with Bitcoin. Against a passive attacker, our scheme provides an anonymity set of all other users mixing coins contemporaneously. This is an interesting new property with no clear analog in better-studied communication mixes. Against active attackers our scheme offers similar anonymity to traditional communication mixes.

Keywords

Chunk Size Anonymous Communication Block Chain Passive Adversary Honest Behavior 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

We thank our anonymous referees and all who read drafts and contributed valuable suggestions to this work, especially Aaron Johnson, Ian Miers, Roger Dingledine, George Danezis, Peter Eckersley, Peter Todd and Eran Tromer. Joshua Kroll was supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program under grant number DGE-1148900.

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Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph Bonneau
    • 1
    Email author
  • Arvind Narayanan
    • 1
  • Andrew Miller
    • 2
  • Jeremy Clark
    • 3
  • Joshua A. Kroll
    • 1
  • Edward W. Felten
    • 1
  1. 1.Princeton UniversityPrincetonUSA
  2. 2.University of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  3. 3.Concordia UniversityMontrealCanada

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