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USB Connection Vulnerabilities on Android Smartphones: Default and Vendors’ Customizations

  • André Pereira
  • Manuel Correia
  • Pedro Brandão
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8735)

Abstract

We expose an USB vulnerability in some vendors’ customization of the android system, where the serial AT commands processed by the cellular modem are extended to allow other functionalities. We target that vulnerability for the specific vendor system and present a proof of concept of the attack in a realistic scenario environment. For this we use an apparently inoffensive smartphone charging station like the one that is now common at public places like airports. We unveil the implications of such vulnerability that culminate in flashing a compromised boot partition, root access, enable adb and install a surveillance application that is impossible to uninstall without re-flashing the android boot partition. All these attacks are done without user consent or knowledge on the attacked mobile phone.

Keywords

Android Security USB vulnerability privileges escalation vendor vulnerabilities 

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • André Pereira
    • 1
  • Manuel Correia
    • 1
  • Pedro Brandão
    • 2
  1. 1.Center for Research in Advanced Computing Systems (CRACS-INESC LA)Portugal
  2. 2.Instituto de Telecomunicações, FCUP/UPPortugal

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