Determining Cryptographic Distinguishers for eStream and SHA-3 Candidate Functions with Evolutionary Circuits

  • Petr Švenda
  • Martin Ukrop
  • Vashek Matyáš
Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 456)


Cryptanalysis of a cryptographic function usually requires advanced cryptanalytical skills and extensive amount of human labor with an option of using randomness testing suites like STS NIST [1] or Dieharder [2]. These can be applied to test statistical properties of cryptographic function outputs. We propose a more open approach based on software circuit that acts as a testing function automatically evolved by a stochastic optimization algorithm. Information leaked during cryptographic function evaluation is used to find a distinguisher [4] of outputs produced by 25 candidate algorithms for eStream and SHA-3 competition from truly random sequences. We obtained similar results (with some exceptions) as those produced by STS NIST and Dieharder tests w.r.t. the number of rounds of the inspected algorithm.


eStream Genetic programming Random distinguisher Randomness statistical testing Software circuit 



This work was supported by the GAP202/11/0422 project of the Czech Science Foundation. The access to computing and storage facilities owned by parties and projects contributing to the National Grid Infrastructure MetaCentrum, provided under the program Projects of Large Infrastructure for Research, Development, and Innovations (LM2010005) is highly appreciated.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Masaryk UniversityBrnoCzech Republic

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