International Cryptology Conference

CRYPTO 2014: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2014 pp 405-420

Feasibility and Infeasibility of Secure Computation with Malicious PUFs

  • Dana Dachman-Soled
  • Nils Fleischhacker
  • Jonathan Katz
  • Anna Lysyanskaya
  • Dominique Schröder
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-44381-1_23

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8617)
Cite this paper as:
Dachman-Soled D., Fleischhacker N., Katz J., Lysyanskaya A., Schröder D. (2014) Feasibility and Infeasibility of Secure Computation with Malicious PUFs. In: Garay J.A., Gennaro R. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2014. CRYPTO 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8617. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

A recent line of work has explored the use of physically uncloneable functions (PUFs) for secure computation, with the goals of (1) achieving universal composability without (additional) setup, and/or (2) obtaining unconditional security (i.e., avoiding complexity-theoretic assumptions). Initial work assumed that all PUFs, even those created by an attacker, are honestly generated. Subsequently, researchers have investigated models in which an adversary can create malicious PUFs with arbitrary behavior. Researchers have considered both malicious PUFs that might be stateful, as well as malicious PUFs that can have arbitrary behavior but are guaranteed to be stateless.

We settle the main open questions regarding secure computation in the malicious-PUF model:
  • We prove that unconditionally secure oblivious transfer is impossible, even in the stand-alone setting, if the adversary can construct (malicious) stateful PUFs.

  • We show that universally composable two-party computation is possible if the attacker is limited to creating (malicious) stateless PUFs. Our protocols are simple and efficient, and do not require any cryptographic assumptions.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dana Dachman-Soled
    • 1
  • Nils Fleischhacker
    • 2
  • Jonathan Katz
    • 1
  • Anna Lysyanskaya
    • 3
  • Dominique Schröder
    • 2
  1. 1.University of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  2. 2.Saarland UniversitySaarbrückenGermany
  3. 3.Brown UniversityProvidenceUSA

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