Advancing the Art of Simulation in the Social Sciences

  • Robert Axelrod
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 456)


Advancing the state of the art of simulation in the social sciences requires appreciating the unique value of simulation as a third way of doing science, in contrast to both induction and deduction. This essay offers advice for doing simulation research, focusing on the programming of a simulation model, analyzing the results and sharing the results with others. Replicating other people’s simulations gets special emphasis, with examples of the procedures and difficulties involved in the process of replication. Finally, suggestions are offered for building of a community of social scientists who do simulation.


Rational Choice Social Science Citation Index Simulation Research Organizational Code Artificial Society 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Axelrod
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Public PolicyUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA

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