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Rational Choice and Asymmetric Learning in Iterated Social Interactions – Some Lessons from Agent-Based Modeling

  • Dominik KleinEmail author
  • Johannes Marx
  • Simon Scheller
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

In this contribution we analyze how the actions of rational agents feed back on their beliefs. We present two agent-based computer simulations studying complex social interactions in which agents that follow utility maximizing strategies thereby deteriorate their own long-term quality of beliefs. We take these results as a starting point to discuss the complex relationship between rational action couched in terms of maximizing utility and the emergence of informational inequalities.

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Lehrstuhl für Politische TheorieOtto-Friedrich-Universität BambergBambergDeutschland
  2. 2.Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität MünchenMünchenDeutschland

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