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Fairness Preferences and Priming in Contracting

  • Torsten GullyEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Edition KWV book series (EKWV)

Abstract

Many economists model individual behavior through preferences in utility functions (Camerer and Loewenstein 2004; DellaVigna 2009). The standard (neoclassical) economic theory assumes that these preferences are narrowly self-interested (cf. Samuelson 1948). However, the behavioral economic literature shows that preferences should also include social preferences, which take the well-being of others into account (e.g., Charness and Rabin 2002; Cooper and Kagel 2009; Fehr and Fischbacher 2002; Fehr and Schmidt 2006).

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.WiesbadenGermany

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