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Funktionen und Positionen in Familienunternehmen

  • Birgit Felden
  • Andreas Hack
  • Christina Hoon
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

In diesem Kapitel werden Sie zunächst erfahren, wie Entscheidungsprozesse in Familienunternehmen vollzogen werden. Die Möglichkeiten, in Unternehmen zu entscheiden, werden juristisch über die Inhaberschaft konstituiert. Anders formuliert: Nur derjenige, dem Anteile des Unternehmens gehören, kann die damit verbundenen Rechte wahrnehmen; er oder sie hat jedoch auch die damit einhergehenden Verpflichtungen zu erfüllen.

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für EntrepreneurshipHochschule für Wirtschaft und Recht BerlinBerlinDeutschland
  2. 2.Institut für Organisation und PersonalUniversität BernBernSchweiz
  3. 3.Stiftungslehrstuhl Führung von Familienunternehmen; Institut für Familienunternehmen (iFUn)Universität BielefeldBielefeldDeutschland

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