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  • Birgit FeldenEmail author
  • Andreas Hack
  • Christina Hoon
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

Im vorausgegangenen Kapitel haben wir uns mit dem ressourcenorientierten Ansatz beschäftigt, der Unternehmen als ein Bündel von Ressourcen versteht, aus dem sich nachhaltige Vorteile gegenüber den Wettbewerbern generieren lassen. Die Theorie der Verfügungsrechte geht allerdings von der Annahme aus, dass sich Unternehmen in Austauschprozesse begeben müssen, um in Markttransaktionen Nachfragende zu identifizieren, Bedarfe und Angebote zu bestimmen und Verhandlungen über Preise und Marktbedingungen zu führen. Zudem müssen Verträge geschlossen, überwacht und kontrolliert werden.

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für EntrepreneurshipHochschule für Wirtschaft und Recht BerlinBerlinDeutschland
  2. 2.Institut für Organisation und PersonalUniversität BernBernSchweiz
  3. 3.Stiftungslehrstuhl Führung von Familienunternehmen; Institut für Familienunternehmen (iFUn)Universität BielefeldBielefeldDeutschland

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