Regieren durch Risiko

Staatlichkeit im europäischen Finanzregulierungsdiskurs
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Zusammenfassung

Die Neuausrichtung der Eigenkapitalanforderungen für Banken verweist auf die veränderte Stellung souveräner Staatlichkeit innerhalb der Europäischen Union (EU). Das vorausgehende Zitat verdeutlicht, wie der Europäische Ausschuss für Systemrisiken das Risiko des Zahlungsausfalls durch Staaten in die Finanzmarktregulierung einschreiben möchte. Mit dieser Anforderung geht der ExpertInnendiskurs einen Schritt über die erst kürzlich erfolgte Neugewichtung des Eigenkapitals für Banken in der EU hinaus und verdeutlicht, wie die Gefahr eines Staatsbankrotts durch den europäischen Regulierungsdiskurs eingehegt werden soll.

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.GießenDeutschland

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