Das Kalkül des strategischen Wählens unter relativer Mehrheitswahl

  • Michael Herrmann
Chapter
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Zusammenfassung

Wie funktioniert strategisches Wählen mit der Erststimme? Dieses Kapitel führt in die Theorie strategischen Wählens mit der Erststimme ein. Es stellt das Entscheidungsproblem eines Wählers unter relativer Mehrheitswahl mit drei Parteien dar. Aus dem Vergleich von Pattsituationen wird die optimale Entscheidungsregel abgeleitet, die darin besteht, den bevorzugten unter den beiden führenden Kandidaten zu wählen. Dieselbe Regel gilt, wenn mehr als drei Parteien im Wahlkreis konkurrieren.

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Herrmann
    • 1
  1. 1.Universität KonstanzKonstanzDeutschland

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