Intuition und Führung

Wie gute Entscheidungen entstehen
  • Gerd GigerenzerEmail author
  • Wolfgang Gaissmaier
Part of the uniscope. Publikationen der SGO Stiftung book series (UNISCOPE)


We describe three major cognitive systems: (1) emotional intuition, (2) deliberate thinking, and (3) intuitive reasoning. Although we argue for the superiority of the third level in most cases, we indicate the value of each level in different circumstances. Not all levels are possible in all circumstances. The distinction between these levels is illustrated in everyday life, moral behavior, romantic relationships, and in leadership and management. While the ability to use all three systems in an optimal manner is to a great extent a matter of natural talent, this ability can be acquired and improved. An essential step is to understand the nature of each system. We offer some such understanding.


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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Max-Planck-Institut für BildungsforschungBerlinDeutschland
  2. 2.Universität KonstanzKonstanzDeutschland

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