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Effizienz militärischer Leistung

Caveat emptor!
  • Marcus Matthias Keupp
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

Effektivität ist eine notwendige, nicht aber eine hinreichende Bedingung für die Beurteilung militärischer Leistung. Denn die ökonomische Analyse der Leistungserstellung umfasst nicht nur die Frage der Effektivität, d.h. ob und inwiefern die Leistungsziele erreicht wurden. Es kommt ebenso auf die Effizienz der Leistung an, d.h. auf das Verhältnis von Leistungsergebnis und Ressourceneinsatz.

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marcus Matthias Keupp
    • 1
  1. 1.Militärakademie an der ETH ZürichZürichSchweiz

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