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Part of the book series: Research in Criminology ((RESEARCH CRIM.))

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Abstract

Psychologists working in the field of law and psychology tend to think that there is a special relationship between the two disciplines. The law, as a system of rules and a practice of applying these rules, is a human, perhaps an all too human, enterprise. The rules of law, however, are not only invented and applied by men; they are also meant to apply to men. As a device for the control of human behavior, the law is subject to empirical constraints of a psychological nature. In order to be successful, the law must take into account the possibilities and impossibilities of human behavior. The rules can only prescribe what is humanly possible; they cannot forbid what is humanly unavoidable. As an institution it should only take measures that can successfully affect behavior. There is no moral issue here; it is merely a matter of practicalities. If the law disregards the constraints of empirical psychology, it simply becomes ineffective. Whether that would be morally wrong is at best a secondary question.

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© 1989 Springer-Verlag New York Inc.

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Crombag, H.F.M. (1989). When Law and Psychology Meet. In: Wegener, H., Lösel, F., Haisch, J. (eds) Criminal Behavior and the Justice System. Research in Criminology. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-86017-1_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-86017-1_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-86019-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-86017-1

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