Some Interactive Decision Problems Emerging in Statistical Games
We consider games which arise when two statisticians must make a decision simultaneously, and the loss function depends on both decisions. We are interested, in particular, in situations when information is detrimental, in a sense to be made precise. We show that in certain problems related to Bayesian testing and prediction the phenomenon of information rejection occurs for certain values of the parameters involved.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Private Information Expected Utility Single Statistician Strategy Profile
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Avenhaus, R., von Stengel, B., Zamir, S. (1995). Inspection games. Preprint.Google Scholar
- 2.Bassan, B., Gossner, O., Scarsini, M., Zamir, S. (2000). On the value of information in interactive decision systems. Preprint.Google Scholar
- 3.Bassan, B., Scarsini, M., Zamir, S. (1998). Uniqueness of Pareto optima, coordination games and positive value of information. Preprint.Google Scholar
- 4.Bassan, B., Scarsini, M., Zamir, S. (2001). Role of information in the interaction of two statisticians: some game theoretic results. In Recent Developments in Operational Research, Agarwal, M.L., Sen, K. (Eds.), 33–43, Narosa, New Delhi estimationGoogle Scholar
- 5.Harsanyi, J.C. (1967/68). Games with incomplete information played by ‘Bayesian’ players, Parts I, II, and III. Managea. Sci. 14, 159–182, 320–334, 486–502Google Scholar