Rent-Seeking and Rent-Setting: Government Versus Competition (The Case of St. Petersburg)

  • Andrei Zaostrovtsev
Conference paper

Abstract

The proliferation of rent-seeking practices in Russia’s post-communist economy has been explained in different ways. Most theories focus on the behavioral peculiarities of former state-owned companies, their incapacity, for a variety of reasons, to compete in a free market and provide quality that meets consumer needs (Alfandari, Fan and Freinkman, 1997; Earle, Estrin and Leschenko, 1997; Braguinsky, 1997; Kuznetsov, 1997). One other explanation links the dominance of rent-seeking practices in the Russian economy to missing markets (Polishchuk, 1997).

Keywords

Alcoholic Beverage Industrial Policy License Applicant Background Check License Authority 
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrei Zaostrovtsev

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