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Protecting Obfuscation against Algebraic Attacks

  • Boaz Barak
  • Sanjam Garg
  • Yael Tauman Kalai
  • Omer Paneth
  • Amit Sahai
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8441)

Abstract

Recently, Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Raykova, Sahai, and Waters (FOCS 2013) constructed a general-purpose obfuscating compiler for NC1 circuits. We describe a simplified variant of this compiler, and prove that it is a virtual black box obfuscator in a generic multilinear map model. This improves on Brakerski and Rothblum (eprint 2013) who gave such a result under a strengthening of the Exponential Time Hypothesis. We remove this assumption, and thus resolve an open question of Garg et al. As shown by Garg et al., a compiler for NC1 circuits can be bootstrapped to a compiler for all polynomial-sized circuits under the learning with errors (LWE) hardness assumption.

Our result shows that there is a candidate obfuscator that cannot be broken by algebraic attacks, hence reducing the task of creating secure obfuscators in the plain model to obtaining sufficiently strong security guarantees on candidate instantiations of multilinear maps.

Keywords

Random Oracle Arithmetic Circuit Algebraic Attack Cryptology ePrint Archive Learning With Error 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Boaz Barak
    • 1
  • Sanjam Garg
    • 2
  • Yael Tauman Kalai
    • 1
  • Omer Paneth
    • 3
  • Amit Sahai
    • 4
  1. 1.Microsoft ResearchUSA
  2. 2.IBM ResearchUSA
  3. 3.Boston UniversityUSA
  4. 4.UCLAUSA

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