SMT-Based Verification of Software Countermeasures against Side-Channel Attacks

  • Hassan Eldib
  • Chao Wang
  • Patrick Schaumont
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8413)

Abstract

A common strategy for designing countermeasures against side channel attacks is using randomization techniques to remove the statistical dependency between sensitive data and side-channel emissions. However, this process is both labor intensive and error prone, and currently, there is a lack of automated tools to formally access how secure a countermeasure really is. We propose the first SMT solver based method for formally verifying the security of a countermeasures against such attacks. In addition to checking whether the sensitive data are masked, we also check whether they are perfectly masked, i.e., whether the joint distribution of any d intermediate computation results is independent of the secret key. We encode this verification problem into a series of quantifier-free first-order logic formulas, whose satisfiability can be decided by an off-the-shelf SMT solver. We have implemented the new method in a tool based on the LLVM compiler and the Yices SMT solver. Our experiments on recently proposed countermeasures show that the method is both effective and efficient for practical use.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hassan Eldib
    • 1
  • Chao Wang
    • 1
  • Patrick Schaumont
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of ECEVirginia TechBlacksburgUSA

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