On the Stability of Generalized Second Price Auctions with Budgets

  • Josep Díaz
  • Ioannis Giotis
  • Lefteris Kirousis
  • Evangelos Markakis
  • Maria Serna
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8392)


The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the differences between these mechanisms and find that only some of them exhibit both notions of stability. This shows the importance of carefully picking the right mechanism to ensure stable outcomes in the presence of budgets.


Nash Equilibrium Budget Constraint Combinatorial Auction Price Auction Slot Allocation 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Josep Díaz
    • 1
  • Ioannis Giotis
    • 1
    • 2
  • Lefteris Kirousis
    • 3
  • Evangelos Markakis
    • 2
  • Maria Serna
    • 1
  1. 1.Departament de Llenguatges i Sistemes InformaticsUniversitat Politecnica de CatalunyaBarcelonaSpain
  2. 2.Department of Informatics AthensUniversity of Economics and BusinessGreece
  3. 3.Department of Mathematics, Greece and Computer Technology Institute & Press “Diophantus”National & Kapodistrian University of AthensGreece

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