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(Efficient) Universally Composable Oblivious Transfer Using a Minimal Number of Stateless Tokens

  • Seung Geol Choi
  • Jonathan Katz
  • Dominique Schröder
  • Arkady Yerukhimovich
  • Hong-Sheng Zhou
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8349)

Abstract

We continue the line of work initiated by Katz (Eurocrypt 2007) on using tamper-proof hardware for universally composable secure computation. As our main result, we show an efficient oblivious-transfer (OT) protocol in which two parties each create and exchange a single, stateless token and can then run an unbounded number of OTs. Our result yields what we believe is the most practical and efficient known approach for oblivious transfer based on tamper-proof tokens, and implies that the parties can perform (repeated) secure computation of arbitrary functions without exchanging additional tokens.

Motivated by this result, we investigate the minimal number of stateless tokens needed for universally composable OT/secure computation. We prove that our protocol is optimal in this regard for constructions making black-box use of the tokens (in a sense we define). We also show that nonblack-box techniques can be used to obtain a construction using only a single stateless token.

Keywords

Signature Scheme Turing Machine Secure Computation Commitment Scheme Oblivious Transfer 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Seung Geol Choi
    • 1
  • Jonathan Katz
    • 2
  • Dominique Schröder
    • 3
  • Arkady Yerukhimovich
    • 4
  • Hong-Sheng Zhou
    • 5
  1. 1.United States Naval AcademyUSA
  2. 2.University of MarylandUSA
  3. 3.Saarland UniversityGermany
  4. 4.MIT Lincoln LaboratoryUSA
  5. 5.Virginia Commonwealth UniversityUSA

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