Towards Characterizing Complete Fairness in Secure Two-Party Computation

  • Gilad Asharov
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8349)

Abstract

The well known impossibility result of Cleve (STOC 1986) implies that in general it is impossible to securely compute a function with complete fairness without an honest majority. Since then, the accepted belief has been that nothing non-trivial can be computed with complete fairness in the two party setting. The surprising work of Gordon, Hazay, Katz and Lindell (STOC 2008) shows that this belief is false, and that there exist some non-trivial (deterministic, finite-domain) boolean functions that can be computed fairly. This raises the fundamental question of characterizing complete fairness in secure two-party computation.

In this work we show that not only that some or few functions can be computed fairly, but rather an enormous amount of functions can be computed with complete fairness. In fact, almost all boolean functions with distinct domain sizes can be computed with complete fairness (for instance, more than 99.999% of the boolean functions with domain sizes 31 ×30). The class of functions that is shown to be possible includes also rather involved and highly non-trivial tasks, such as set-membership, evaluation of a private (Boolean) function and private matchmaking.

In addition, we demonstrate that fairness is not restricted to the class of symmetric boolean functions where both parties get the same output, which is the only known feasibility result. Specifically, we show that fairness is also possible for asymmetric boolean functions where the output of the parties is not necessarily the same. Moreover, we consider the class of functions with non-binary output, and show that fairness is possible for any finite range.

The constructions are based on the protocol of Gordon et. al, and the analysis uses tools from convex geometry.

Keywords

Complete fairness secure two-party computation foundations malicious adversaries 

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gilad Asharov
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceBar-Ilan UniversityIsrael

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