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Values of Games with a Priori Unions

  • Guilliermo Owen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 141)

Abstract

We study here the problem of modifying the (Shapley) value of a characteristic function game so as to take into account the possibility that some players — because of personal or political affinities — may be more likely to act together than others. We shall use y[v] to denote the usual value of the game v.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1977

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guilliermo Owen
    • 1
  1. 1.Rice UniversityHoustonUSA

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