Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling Scheduling
We consider a strategic game, where players submit jobs to a machine that executes all jobs in a way that minimizes energy while respecting the jobs’ deadlines. The energy consumption is then charged to the players in some way. Each player wants to minimize the sum of that charge and of their job’s deadline multiplied by a priority weight. Two charging schemes are studied, the proportional cost share which does not always admit pure Nash equilibria, and the marginal cost share, which does always admit pure Nash equilibria, at the price of overcharging by a constant factor.
KeywordsMechanism Design Cost Share Strategic Game Potential Game Pure Nash Equilibrium
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