Reaching Your Goals without Spilling the Beans: Boolean Secrecy Games

  • Nils Bulling
  • Sujata Ghosh
  • Rineke Verbrugge
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8291)


Inspired by the work on Boolean games, we present turn-based games where each of the players controls a set of atomic variables and each player wants to achieve some individual goal in such a way that the other players remain unaware of the goal until it is actually achieved. We present definitions of winning such games with hidden goals for different non-cooperative settings, and discuss in which types of situations players have winning or equilibrium strategies. We also provide some complexity bounds on deciding whether a player has a winning strategy.


Multiagent System Winning Strategy Truth Assignment Partial Valuation Extensive Form Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nils Bulling
    • 1
  • Sujata Ghosh
    • 2
  • Rineke Verbrugge
    • 3
  1. 1.Clausthal University of TechnologyClausthalGermany
  2. 2.Indian Statistical InstituteChennaiIndia
  3. 3.University of GroningenGroningenNetherlands

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