Defendable Security in Interaction Protocols

  • Wojciech Jamroga
  • Matthijs Melissen
  • Henning Schnoor
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8291)


We study the security of interaction protocols when incentives of participants are taken into account. We begin by formally defining correctness of a protocol, given a notion of rationality and utilities of participating agents. Based on that, we propose how to assess security when the precise incentives are unknown. Then, the security level can be defined in terms of defender sets, i.e., sets of participants who can effectively “defend” the security property as long as they are in favor of the property. In terms of technical results, we present a theoretical characterization of defendable protocols under Nash equilibrium, and study the computational complexity of related decision problems.


Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Solution Concept Security Protocol Security Property 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wojciech Jamroga
    • 1
  • Matthijs Melissen
    • 1
  • Henning Schnoor
    • 2
  1. 1.Computer Science and Communication and Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability, and TrustUniversity of LuxembourgLuxembourg
  2. 2.Arbeitsgruppe Theoretische InformatikUniversity of KielGermany

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