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Threat Modeling of AMI

  • Inger Anne Tøndel
  • Martin Gilje Jaatun
  • Maria Bartnes Line
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7722)

Abstract

The introduction of an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) into the power grid forces the power industry to address information security threats and consumer privacy more extensively than before. The industry needs practical advice on methods and tools to use in this context. Threat modeling is well-known among information security professionals as a method for investigating a system’s vulnerabilities. This paper documents the threat modeling of one actual AMI configuration. The results are both a demonstration of how these techniques can be applied to AMI, and a documentation of risks associated with this specific AMI configuration.

Keywords

Smart Grid Advanced Metering Infrastructure Information Security Privacy Threat Modeling STRIDE 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Inger Anne Tøndel
    • 1
  • Martin Gilje Jaatun
    • 1
  • Maria Bartnes Line
    • 1
  1. 1.SINTEF ICTTrondheimNorway

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