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Inefficiency of Games with Social Context

  • Aris Anagnostopoulos
  • Luca Becchetti
  • Bart de Keijzer
  • Guido Schäfer
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8146)

Abstract

The study of other-regarding player behavior such as altruism and spite in games has recently received quite some attention in the algorithmic game theory literature. Already for very simple models, it has been shown that altruistic behavior can actually be harmful for society in the sense that the price of anarchy may increase as the players become more altruistic. In this paper, we study the severity of this phenomenon for more realistic settings in which there is a complex underlying social structure, causing the players to direct their altruistic and spiteful behavior in a refined player-specific sense (depending, for example, on friendships that exist among the players). Our findings show that the increase in the price of anarchy is modest for congestion games and minsum scheduling games, whereas it is drastic for generalized second price auctions.

Keywords

Altruistic Behavior Price Auction Congestion Game Pure Nash Equilibrium Related Machine 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aris Anagnostopoulos
    • 1
  • Luca Becchetti
    • 1
  • Bart de Keijzer
    • 2
  • Guido Schäfer
    • 2
  1. 1.Sapienza University of RomeItaly
  2. 2.CWI and VU University AmsterdamThe Netherlands

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