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Practical Attacks against the I2P Network

  • Christoph Egger
  • Johannes Schlumberger
  • Christopher Kruegel
  • Giovanni Vigna
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8145)

Abstract

Anonymity networks, such as Tor or I2P, were built to allow users to access network resources without revealing their identity. Newer designs, like I2P, run in a completely decentralized fashion, while older systems, like Tor, are built around central authorities. The decentralized approach has advantages (no trusted central party, better scalability), but there are also security risks associated with the use of distributed hash tables (DHTs) in this environment.

I2P was built with these security problems in mind, and the network is considered to provide anonymity for all practical purposes. Unfortunately, this is not entirely justified. In this paper, we present a group of attacks that can be used to deanonymize I2P users. Specifically, we show that an attacker, with relatively limited resources, is able to deanonymize a I2P user that accesses a resource of interest with high probability.

Keywords

Service Information Malicious Node Distribute Hash Table Sybil Attack Attack Node 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christoph Egger
    • 1
  • Johannes Schlumberger
    • 2
  • Christopher Kruegel
    • 2
  • Giovanni Vigna
    • 2
  1. 1.Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-NurembergGermany
  2. 2.University of CaliforniaSanta BarbaraUSA

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