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Using Interpolation for the Verification of Security Protocols

  • Marco Rocchetto
  • Luca Viganò
  • Marco Volpe
  • Giacomo Dalle Vedove
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8203)

Abstract

Interpolation has been successfully applied in formal methods for model checking and test-case generation for sequential programs. Security protocols, however, exhibit such idiosyncrasies that make them unsuitable to the direct application of such methods. In this paper, we address this problem and present an interpolation-based method for security protocol verification. Our method starts from a formal protocol specification and combines Craig interpolation, symbolic execution and the standard Dolev-Yao intruder model to search for possible attacks on the protocol. Interpolants are generated as a response to search failure in order to prune possible useless traces and speed up the exploration. We illustrate our method by means of a concrete example and discuss the results obtained by using a prototype implementation.

Keywords

Security protocols Symbolic execution Craig’s interpolation Formal methods Verification 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marco Rocchetto
    • 1
  • Luca Viganò
    • 1
  • Marco Volpe
    • 1
  • Giacomo Dalle Vedove
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversità di VeronaItaly

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