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Aggregated Beliefs and Informational Cascades

  • Rasmus K. Rendsvig
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8196)

Abstract

In the 1992 paper [1] Bikchandani et al. show how it may be rational for Bayesian agents in a sequential decision making scenario to ignore their private information and conform to the choices made by previous agents. If this occurs, an agent ignoring her private information is said to be in a cascade.

Keywords

Private Information Transition Rule Kripke Model Epistemic Logic Sequential Decision 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. 1.
    Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., Welch, I.: A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political Economy 100(5), 992–1026 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Rendsvig, R.K.: Aggregated Beliefs and Information Cascades (extended) (2013), http://vince-inc.com/rendsvig/papers/IC1.pdf

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rasmus K. Rendsvig
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Media, Cognition and CommunicationUniversity of CopenhagenDenmark

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