Run-Time Enforcement of Information-Flow Properties on Android

(Extended Abstract)
  • Limin Jia
  • Jassim Aljuraidan
  • Elli Fragkaki
  • Lujo Bauer
  • Michael Stroucken
  • Kazuhide Fukushima
  • Shinsaku Kiyomoto
  • Yutaka Miyake
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8134)

Abstract

Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the number and importance of mobile devices. The security properties that these devices provide to their applications, however, are inadequate to protect against many undesired behaviors. A broad class of such behaviors is violations of simple information-flow properties. This paper proposes an enforcement system that permits Android applications to be concisely annotated with information-flow policies, which the system enforces at run time. Information-flow constraints are enforced both between applications and between components within applications, aiding developers in implementing least privilege. We model our enforcement system in detail using a process calculus, and use the model to prove noninterference. Our system and model have a number of useful and novel features, including support for Android’s single- and multiple-instance components, floating labels, declassification and endorsement capabilities, and support for legacy applications. We have developed a prototype of our system on Android 4.0.4 and tested it on a Nexus S phone, verifying that it can enforce practically useful policies that can be implemented with minimal modification to off-the-shelf applications.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Limin Jia
    • 1
  • Jassim Aljuraidan
    • 1
  • Elli Fragkaki
    • 1
  • Lujo Bauer
    • 1
  • Michael Stroucken
    • 1
  • Kazuhide Fukushima
    • 2
  • Shinsaku Kiyomoto
    • 2
  • Yutaka Miyake
    • 2
  1. 1.Carnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburghUSA
  2. 2.KDDI R&D Laboratories, Inc.TokyoJapan

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