Universally Composable Key-Management

  • Steve Kremer
  • Robert Künnemann
  • Graham Steel
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8134)

Abstract

We present the first universally composable key-management functionality, formalized in the GNUC framework by Hofheinz and Shoup. It allows the enforcement of a wide range of security policies and can be extended by diverse key usage operations with no need to repeat the security proof. We illustrate its use by proving an implementation of a security token secure with respect to arbitrary key-usage operations and explore a proof technique that allows the storage of cryptographic keys externally, a novel development in simulation-based security frameworks.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Steve Kremer
    • 1
  • Robert Künnemann
    • 2
  • Graham Steel
    • 2
  1. 1.LORIA & INRIA Nancy – Grand-EstFrance
  2. 2.INRIA Paris – RocquencourtFrance

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