Everlasting Multi-party Computation

  • Dominique Unruh
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8043)


A protocol has everlasting security if it is secure against adversaries that are computationally unlimited after the protocol execution. This models the fact that we cannot predict which cryptographic schemes will be broken, say, several decades after the protocol execution. In classical cryptography, everlasting security is difficult to achieve: even using trusted setup like common reference strings or signature cards, many tasks such as secure communication and oblivious transfer cannot be achieved with everlasting security. An analogous result in the quantum setting excludes protocols based on common reference strings, but not protocols using a signature card. We define a variant of the Universal Composability framework, everlasting quantum-UC, and show that in this model, we can implement secure communication and general multi-party computation using signature cards as trusted setup.


Signature Scheme Commitment Scheme Quantum Memory Oblivious Transfer Protocol Execution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dominique Unruh
    • 1
  1. 1.University of TartuEstonia

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