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Electromagnetic Glitch on the AES Round Counter

  • Amine Dehbaoui
  • Amir-Pasha Mirbaha
  • Nicolas Moro
  • Jean-Max Dutertre
  • Assia Tria
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7864)

Abstract

This article presents a Round Addition Analysis on a software implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (aes) algorithm. The round keys are computed on-the-fly during each encryption. A non-invasive transient fault injection is achieved on the aes round counter. The attack is performed by injecting a very short electromagnetic glitch on a 32-bit microcontroller based on the arm Cortex-M3 processor. Using this experimental setup, we are able to disrupt the round counter increment at the end of the penultimate round and execute one additional round. This faulty execution enables us to recover the encryption key with only two pairs of corresponding correct and faulty ciphertexts.

Keywords

Advance Encryption Standard Fault Injection Fault Attack Faulty Ciphertext Fault Injection Attack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amine Dehbaoui
    • 1
  • Amir-Pasha Mirbaha
    • 2
  • Nicolas Moro
    • 1
  • Jean-Max Dutertre
    • 2
  • Assia Tria
    • 1
  1. 1.CEA-LETIGardanneFrance
  2. 2.École nationale supérieure des Mines de Saint-ÉtienneGardanneFrance

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